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Precap; Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Weber: Must Big
Mountain Jesus Come Down from the Hillside?
Constance Van Kley
I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Does the Freedom from Religion Foundation (“FFRF”) have
standing to bring suit?
Does the continued authorization of a privately owned statue of
Jesus Christ on publically owned land violate the Establishment Clause
when the statue serves some secular purpose and is within the boundaries
of a privately operated ski resort?
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1953, the United States Forest Service (“USFS”) issued a
Special Use Permit to the Knights of Columbus to erect and maintain a
six-foot-tall stone and cement statue of Jesus Christ on USFS land leased
to a private ski resort, Whitefish Mountain Resort (“Big Mountain”).1
When the Knights of Columbus placed the statue in 1954, it was seventy
feet above the top of the Big Mountain’s sole ski lift.2 When the resort
expanded in 1960 and again in 1968, chairlifts carried skiers above the
site of the statue, allowing patrons to encounter Big Mountain Jesus on
their way down the slopes.3
The Knights of Columbus, a Roman Catholic organization,
approached the USFS in response to requests from some of its members,
veterans of WWII who had encountered similar religious statuary on
Italian slopes during tours in Europe.4 It is unclear whether the statue was
initially placed to honor fallen soldiers, but a plaque placed nearby in
2010 suggests that Big Mountain Jesus serves such a commemorative
purpose.5 The Knights of Columbus were certainly also motivated by
religious sympathy, as evidenced by the subject of the statue as well as
its chosen location, which one member described as chosen by “Our
Lord himself.”6
Big Mountain Jesus has served mixed purposes over the years.
Religious ceremonies, including weddings and worship, have been held
at the site, but the parties dispute the frequency of religious use.7 Before
skiers carried cell phones, friends found the statue served as a convenient
Order 3, June 25, 2013, No. 9:12-cv-00019.
Appellee’s Resp. Br. 9, Apr. 30, 2014, No. 13-35770.
3
Id.
4
Order 5-7.
5
Id. at 7.
6
Id. at 5.
7
Appellee’s Resp. Br. 12; Appellant’s Principal Br. 16, Jan. 8. 2014, No. 13-35770.
1
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meeting place. The incongruousness of Big Mountain Jesus, partially
obscured by trees,8 has brought out a spirit of irreverence and playfulness
in many. The statue, regularly featured in skiers’ photos, is often found
dressed in ski gear and other attire.9 Big Mountain Jesus’s hands have so
frequently been broken off by passing skiers’ high-fives that Big
Mountain placed a fence around the area in an unsuccessful attempt to
prevent further damage.10
Although the initial Special Use Permit had no designated
expiration date, the USFS renewed the permit in 1990 and 2000 for tenyear terms.11 The USFS then denied renewal in 2011, citing case law
potentially implicating the constitutionality of further authorizations.12
The Knights of Columbus appealed the denial, and the USFS withdrew
its decision, requesting feedback from the public before making a final
determination.13 The public spoke overwhelmingly in favor of renewing
the permit. The USFS also reached out to the Montana State Historic
Preservation Office, which found that the statue was eligible for listing
on the National Register of Historic Places. The USFS reauthorized the
permit in 2012, citing the historical importance of the statue to Big
Mountain and the surrounding community.14
Pamela Morris, an active Montanan, joined the Freedom from
Religion Foundation (“FFRF”) in early 2012 because of her outrage at
Big Mountain Jesus, which she encountered in 1957 and has actively
avoided since.15 FFRF filed suit in the U.S. District Court of Montana
against Chip Weber, Flathead National Forest Supervisor, and the USFS
on February 8, 2012.16 FFRF requested a declaration that the USFS’s
continued allowance of Big Mountain Jesus on public land violates the
Establishment clause and an injunction ordering withdrawal of USFS
authorization and removal of the statue.17 The District Court
subsequently granted the Knights of Columbus’s unopposed motion to
intervene.18
The Knights of Columbus twice challenged the suit on the
grounds that FFRF lacked standing to sue.19 The District Court twice
denied motions on this issue, ultimately determining that FFRF had
standing based on Ms. Morris’s membership at the time of filing.20 The
Order 8.
Id. at 8
10
Appellee’s Resp. Br. 14.
11
Order 9-10.
12
Appellant’s Principal Br. 5-8.
13
Order 10.
14
Id.
15
Order 16.
16
Compl. Feb. 8, 2012, No. 9:12-cv-00019.
17
Id. at 9-10.
18
Order, May 9, 2012, No. 9:12-cv-00019.
19
Order, Nov. 27, 2012, No. 9:12-cv-00019; Order, June 25, 2013, No. 9:12-cv-00019.
20
Order 16, June 25, 2013.
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District Court nonetheless granted summary judgment to the USFS and
the Knights of Columbus on June 25, 2013, holding that the continued
presence of Big Mountain Jesus on USFS land did not violate the
Establishment Clause. FFRF appealed.
III. ARGUMENT
A. Standing
The District Court analyzed FFRF’s standing to sue under
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, holding
that FFRF had standing because “‘its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to
the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit.’“21 The holding was based in part on the individual standing of
FFRF member Pamela Morris, with the court finding that she satisfied
the test set forth in Summers v. Earth Island Institute: she could
demonstrate the she was “under threat of suffering concrete and
particularized ‘injury in fact; the threat must be actual and imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial
decision will prevent or redress the injury.‘”22
1. Arguments
Appellees Weber and the USFS did not win summary judgment
on this issue but on the constitutional issue discussed below. On appeal,
the Appellees argue that none of the three FFRF members upon whom
the organization asserts its standing had individual standing to sue at the
time the complaint was filed. Member William Cox may have had
individual standing, but he was not a member when FFRF brought suit,
and “[t]he existence of standing turns on the facts as they existed at the
time the complaint was filed.”23 Member Doug Bonham was a member
when FFRF sued, but his injury is neither ongoing nor concrete: he only
saw the statue once and has not since been near it because “[his] aging
knees limit [him].”24 Ms. Morris was also a member when the complaint
was filed, but “her alleged injury is aesthetic or environmental, not
religious”: she may suffer a direct and concrete injury, but her injury
Id. at 14 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)).
Id. (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)).
23
Appellee’s Resp. Br. 32 (citing Skaff v. Meridien N. Am. Beverly Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 832, 838
(9th Cir. 2007)).
24
Id. at 33.
21
22
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stems from the artificiality of the statue in the mountains of Montana.25
The appellees do not argue that FFRF would lack standing if Mr. Cox,
Mr. Bonham, or Ms. Morris had individual standing to sue.
In its reply brief, Appellant FFRF asserts that any of the three
members mentioned had individual standing at the time the complaint
was filed. Mr. Cox, a frequent Big Mountain skier, did not join FFRF
until ten days after the complaint was filed, but he “seeks to vindicate . . .
the very same cause of action that is at stake,” and allowing FFRF to
bring suit on his behalf now promotes judicial economy.26 Mr. Bonham
suffers injury even though he can no longer ski because the statue is a
symbol of religious preference that marginalizes the non-believers such
as himself throughout the Flathead Valley.27 Ms. Morris has
affirmatively avoided “a significant and beautiful ski area in order to
avoid the Jesus Statue, which the district court correctly deemed
controlling.”28
2. Analysis
Appellees Weber and the USFS bring valid objections to the
individual standing of Mr. Cox, Mr. Bonham, and Ms. Morris, but the
Court may nonetheless determine that FFRF has standing based on that
of Mr. Bonham or Ms. Morris. FFRF has been unable to present
authority supporting consideration of Mr. Cox.29 Judicial economy may
well be promoted by considering Mr. Cox’s standing, but a correct
inquiry into the issue of standing likely supersedes consideration of
judicial economy. The Court could find that Mr. Bonham’s concrete and
actual injury is directly attributable to the statue because he has
personally encountered it and was offended by it. It could also find that
Mr. Bonham’s injury is not ongoing because his stated reason for
avoiding the statue is his aging body rather than his outrage.
Additionally, Mr. Bonham’s injury may be caused by the culture of his
community rather than by the statue itself, in which case removal of Big
Mountain Jesus would not redress his injury. Finally, Ms. Morris is
clearly offended by Big Mountain Jesus, which she sees as a blatantly
religious symbol, but her affidavit suggests that her injury may be caused
by the artificiality rather than the religiosity of the statue. The Court
could potentially dismiss for lack of standing, in which case Mr. Cox
may immediately bring a new suit.
B. The Establishment Clause
Id. at 36.
Appellant’s Reply Br. 10-11, May 14, 2014, No. 13-35770.
27
Id. at 8-9.
28
Id. at 9-10.
29
Order 15-16, June 25, 2013, No. 9:12-cv-00019.
25
26
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The District Court applied two analyses to determine the
constitutionality of Big Mountain Jesus, ultimately determining that the
USFS had not violated the Establishment Clause regardless of the
analysis applied.30 The Lemon Test, established in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
“requires that challenged government conduct must (1) have a secular
purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and (3) not foster excessive government entanglement with
religion.”31 An exception was later developed in Van Orden v. Perry,
where a plurality of the Court found the Lemon test unhelpful.32 In his
concurrence, Justice Breyer noted that there is “no test-related substitute
for the exercise of legal judgment[.]“33 Breyer considered the following
factors in his analysis: the historical use of the monument, the
surrounding context, the monument’s history, and the frequency of
complaints.34 Following Trunk,35 the Ninth Circuit recognizes Justice
Breyer’s concurrence as controlling.36
1. The Lemon Test
Arguments
Appellant FFRF argues that the district court erred in finding that
Big Mountain Jesus passes the Lemon test.37 The government’s purpose
was not “predominantly secular” when it authorized an obviously
religious statue, and the USFS’s determination that the statue is
historically important is unsupported by the record.38 The statue has the
primary effect of advancing religion, as it is clearly a Christian shrine,
and any ancillary patriotic or secular meaning is lost on its observers.39
FFRF does not expressly address whether the statue fosters “excessive
government entanglement with religion,” but it argues that “[t]he Jesus
Shrine has the look and feel of being located on Forest Service land, and
the Government’s authorizations have been characterized by secret and
preferential consideration.”40
Appellees Weber and the USFS assert that continued authorization of
Big Mountain Jesus is permissible under the Lemon test. The government
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 21 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
32
Id. at 21-22 (citing Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005)).
33
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700, Breyer, J., concurring.
34
Order at 22, June 25, 2013 (citing Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700, Breyer, J., concurring).
35
Trunk v. City of San Diego 629 F.3d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011).
36
Order at 22, June 25, 2013.
37
Appellant’s Principal Br. 35.
38
Id. at 35-37.
39
Id. at 41-44.
40
Id. at 39.
30
31
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must only show that it is motivated “at least in part by [a] secular
purpose,”41 and the USFS was motivated by the historical and cultural
importance of the statue, not the religious sentiment that motivated the
Knights of Columbus.42 Big Mountain Jesus does not have a primary
effect of advancing religion because a reasonable observer would not see
the statue as endorsement of religion: it is on a privately operated ski hill
with a plaque informing viewers of its history and private ownership.43
Like FFRF, the USFS does not explicitly address the issue of
entanglement, but it does argue that the USFS did not show preferential
treatment and complied with all pertinent regulations.44
Analysis
The Ninth Circuit could potentially go either way on the
constitutionality of the USFS reissuance of permits under the Lemon test.
The first element, secular purpose, will likely be satisfied if it accepts the
standard advanced by the USFS and adopted by the District Court, in
which a secular purpose need only be a partial motivation for the
government action. The record supports a finding that Big Mountain
Jesus serves a partially secular purpose. If, however, the Court requires
the secular purpose to be primary, as FFRF argues it should, it will likely
find that the USFS did not have a secular purpose, failing the Lemon test.
The second element, the advancement of religion, also may or may not
be satisfied. The Court will likely find that Big Mountain Jesus advances
religion, but it may find that a reasonable observer would not impute its
religious message to the government. The third element of entanglement
will likely be satisfied if the second element is. The Court could also
choose to avoid in-depth analysis, holding that a factual issue remains
and remanding.
2. The Van Orden Exception
Arguments
Appellant FFRF asserts that the Van Orden Exception does not
apply to the facts at hand because the Ninth Circuit applies the Lemon
test unless the objection is to a “long-standing religious display[] that
convey[s] a historical or secular message in a non-religious context,” and
Big Mountain Jesus conveys a religious message.45 Unlike Van Orden,
Cholla Ready Mix v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2004).
Appellee’s Resp. Br. 41-42.
Id. at 45-46.
44
Id. at 45, 57-64.
45
Appellant’s Principal Br. at 35 (citing Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d at 1009, 1016 (9th Cir.
2008)).
41
42
43
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where a Ten Commandments monolith was in a museum-like setting,
surrounded by other secular objects that together brought a deeper
understanding of Texas culture.46 Big Mountain Jesus has no “secular
moral message.”47 Thus, the context does not secularize Big Mountain
Jesus.48 Additionally, use of the statue is historically religious: “locals
testify that the serenity of the site presents a meditative opportunity.”49
Even the irreverent use points to the religiosity of the statue, as it “results
from the very incongruity of a religious shrine in a national forest.”50
Appellees Weber and the USFS argue that even If continued
allowance of Big Mountain Jesus fails under Lemon, it falls within the
exception outlined in Van Orden, and consideration of the statue’s use,
context, and history warrants continued authorization.51 The statue’s
secular uses far outweigh religious uses: “[t]he statue has seen only light
and sporadic use as a site for religious services, but it has consistently
been used as a meeting place, a site for photo-taking, and as an object of
irreverent fun.”52 The context surrounding Big Mountain Jesus is largely
secular, as the statue is within the borders of a ski resort, with no area
dedicated to meditation or prayer.53 Finally, the history supports the
USFS’s renewal of the Special Use Permit because Big Mountain Jesus
went unchallenged for fifty-seven years, ten years longer than the Ten
Commandments at issue in Van Orden.54
Analysis
The Ninth Circuit will likely determine that Van Orden does not
apply because the facts here are immediately distinguishable. The
museum-like setting of Van Orden suggests that the Ten Commandments
imparted a weighty historical message, not unlike teaching students of
American History about the religious beliefs of early European settlers.
Big Mountain Jesus is thoroughly enjoyed by locals, but the Court
probably will not find irreverence and playfulness compelling enough to
apply the Van Orden exception. If, however, the exception applies, its
requirements will likely be satisfied: the use, context, and history of Big
Mountain Jesus all serve to secularize the statue.
3. Free Speech in a Public Forum

Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681, Breyer, J., concurring.
Appellant’s Principal Br. at 45 (citing Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681, Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 47.
49
Id. at 46.
50
Id. at 47.
51
Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 47.
52
Id. at 48.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 48-49.
46
47
48
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In granting summary judgment for Appellees Weber and the
USFS, the District Court had no need to reach the Appellees’ argument
that the First Amendment authorizes renewing the Knights of
Columbus’s permit.
Arguments
Appellees Weber and the USFS argue that the National Forest
System lands were a limited public forum prior to 1998, when the
regulations governing issuance of permits were overhauled.55 Big
Mountain Jesus is “at most, private religious speech in a public forum,”
and it is therefore authorized by the Free Speech clause and does not
violate the Establishment clause.56 Because the USFS was a public forum
when the permit was first issued, the USFS would have violated the
Establishment Clause by denying the permit, suggesting prejudice
against religion.57 Similarly, the USFS followed all applicable
regulations in reauthorizing the permit, and those regulations are neutral
as to religion, so denying reauthorization would have compromised the
government’s neutrality toward religion.58 Further, because the USFS
lands covers 193 acres, a monument such as Big Mountain Jesus does
not represent government speech despite its permanence.59
Appellant FFRF argues that a private party may not place a
permanent religious monument on government land under the
Establishment Clause.60 Even if the USFS lands are properly classified as
a public forum, the “Free Speech Clause’s forum analysis ‘simply does
not apply to the installation of permanent monuments on public
property.’”61 The plaque’s attribution of the statue to the Knights of
Columbus does nothing to further the USFS’s argument because the
USFS’s allowance of the statue is at issue, not the statue itself.62 Thus,
the Free Speech Clause does not protect Big Mountain Jesus.
Analysis
If the Ninth Circuit reaches this issue, it will probably find that
the First Amendment does not allow the Knights of Columbus’s
placement of Big Mountain Jesus on federal land. The USFS’s argument
is flawed in that the USFS lands are no longer a public forum and they
were not when the alleged injury—reissuance of the permit—took place.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 52.
57
Id. at 54-55.
58
Id. at 55.
59
Id. at 56-57.
60
Appellant’s Reply Br. 13.
61
Id. at 15 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 480 (2009)).
62
Id. at 17-18.
55
56
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Although FFRF is wrong to assert that there are no exceptions to the rule
that permanent monuments may not be installed on public lands under
the Free Speech clause’s forum analysis,63 the forum analysis probably
does not apply. Even if it did, Big Mountain Jesus is unlikely to be an
exception to the rule.

Appellee’s Resp. Br. 56 (citing Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 480)(“Although [FFRF’s]
quotation is accurate, it omits . . . ‘To be sure, there are limited circumstances in which the forum
doctrine might properly be applied to a permanent monument . . . “).
63

